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Abstract
Does exposure to the refugee crisis fuel support for extreme-right parties? Despite heated debates about the
political repercussions of the refugee crisis in Europe, there exists very little—and sometimes conflicting—
evidence with which to assess the impact of a large influx of refugees on natives’ political attitudes and
behavior.We provide causal evidence fromanatural experiment in Greece, where someAegean islands close
to the Turkish border experienced sudden and drastic increases in the number of Syrian refugeeswhile other
islands slightly farther away—but with otherwise similar institutional and socioeconomic characteristics—
did not. Placebo tests suggest that precrisis trends in vote shares for exposed and nonexposed islands were
virtually identical. This allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the electoral consequences of the refugee
crisis. Our study shows that among islands that faced a massive but transient inflow of refugees passing
through just before the September 2015 election, vote shares for Golden Dawn, themost extreme-right party
in Europe, moderately increased by 2 percentage points (a 44 percent increase at the average). The finding
that mere exposure to the refugee crisis is suicient to fuel support for extreme-right parties has important
implications for our theoretical understanding of the drivers of antirefugee backlash.
Keywords: natural experiments, causal inference, instrumental variables, panel data
1 Introduction
Countries across the globe are struggling to cope with the most severe refugee crisis since the
aermath of World War II. Since the spring of 2015, more than 2 million (UNHCR 2017) new
asylum claims were submitted in Europe alone, most of them from Syrian refugees who crossed
into Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. In addition to the direct financial costs and economic
consequences (Foged and Peri 2016) that transition and receiving countries bear, the crisis has
resulted in severepolitical repercussions inmanydestination countries, includingprotests against
asylum seekers and political violence directed at refugees (Editorial Board 2015). Perhaps most
importantly, the ongoing refugee crisis may also have long-lasting electoral consequences by
aecting natives’ political preferences and their attitudes toward asylum seekers.
Authors’ note:Wewould like to thankElli Palaiologou for helpinguswith thedata collection and theparticipants at the 2016
EPEC Conference, 2016 APSA Annual Conference, 2016 CRETE conference, 2016 ASSET Conference, 2017 NICEP conference
and the 2017 EPSA conference as well as seminar participants at the London School of Economics, King’s College London,
theUniversity of California, LosAngeles, theEuropeanUniversity Institute, and theUniversity ofMannheim for their helpful
comments. D.H. acknowledges support from the Leverhulme Trust. Code and data for the replication of the empirical
analyses can be found on the Political Analysis Dataverse (Dinas et al. 2018).
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Does the influx of refugees increase support for extreme-right parties? Despite heated debates
about asylum policies and the allocation of refugees across Europe (Bansak, Hainmueller, and
Hangartner 2017), there exists very little evidence regarding the impact of refugee arrivals
on native voters’ political preferences and behavior. While there is a sizeable literature that
documents a positive relationship between labor migration and vote shares for anti-immigrant
parties in receiving countries (Barone et al. 2016; Mendez and Cutillas 2014; Halla, Wagner, and
Zweimüller 2015; Brunner and Kuhn 2014; Becker et al. 2016), it is unclear how these findings
translate to the context of refugee migration. Since humanitarian concerns are particularly
important in structuring native attitudes toward asylum seekers (Bansak, Hainmueller, and
Hangartner 2016), we would expect that host communities are ceteris paribus more welcoming
to refugees than to labormigrants. Only recently have two important studies attempted to isolate
the eects of refugee migration on electoral outcomes in Austria (Steinmayr 2016) and Denmark
(Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm 2016), with partially contradictory conclusions. This lack of
knowledge is particularly problematic with respect to countries that have experienced a large
influx of refugees within a very short period of time, such as Greece, which received more than
50% of all refugees crossing into Europe in 2015 (UNHCR 2016).
When trying to isolate the eect that exposure to refugees has on the political attitudes
and behavior of the host population, the key problem for causal inference is that the number
of arrivals is far from randomly assigned. Instead, the process through which refugees select
between dierent potential host countries and communities depends on factors such as religious
or cultural proximity, labor market conditions, and openness toward refugees (Neumayer 2004).
In other words, refugees will, as much as possible, flee to communities that they can reach and
where they are welcome. This selection process severely confounds most existing comparisons
of the political responses of natives to the presence of asylum seekers and refugees. If we find
that communities that experienced a large influx of refugees are less (or more) supportive of
anti-immigrant parties than places that have not, we cannot conclude that these dierences are
caused by refugee arrivals, because the selection ensures that these two groups of communities
are also dierent onmany other confounding characteristics.
By focusing on Greece, one of the European countries most aected by the current refugee
crisis, we overcome this issue by taking advantage of a natural experiment to identify the electoral
consequences of refugee arrivals. As the refugee crisis unfolded in the waters of the Aegean
in spring 2015, Greek islands were converted into the main intermediate points for the bulk of
refugees passing through Greece to Europe. As such, Greek islands were dierentially exposed
to the influx of refugees merely because they were closer to or farther away from the Turkish
coast where boats with refugees departed. For example, the island of Lesvos (with a population
of about 80,000) saw more than 200,000 asylum seekers passing through between May and
September 2015. Yet the neighboring island of Lemnos, which belongs to the same geographical
and administrative unit and features similar socioeconomic and political conditions, did not
receiveany refugeesover this period, simplybecause it is a fewmiles farther away fromtheTurkish
coast (see Figure 1, Panel A, for a map of the Aegean Sea).
Several factors facilitate our identification strategy. First, among the 95 habitable islands in
the Aegean Sea, distance to the Turkish border caused significant variation in the number of
refugees arriving in each of these islands. Second, refugees tended to be housed within specific
areas on each island. This allows us to exploit both between- and within-island variation in the
number of refugee arrivals. Third, Greece held an election on September 20, 2015, right aer the
first wave of refugee arrivals that the country encountered throughout the spring and summer
of 2015. The previous election had taken place only eight months prior in January 2015, before
significant numbers of refugees arrived (see Figure 1, Panel B). The SI Appendix Sections S2.1 and
S2.2 provide more information about the elections, which took place in the context of the Greek
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Figure 1. Panel A shows that islands close to the Turkish border received themost refugee arrivals per capita.
Panel B shows themonthly number of asylum seekers arriving at Greek islands over the period from January
2014 to March 2016. During the study period, the first election took place just before the onset of the refugee
crisis on January 25, 2015. A second election took place at the height of the refugee crisis on September 20,
2015.
financial crisis. Twomore elections, both in 2012, also serve as possible counterfactuals of support
for extreme-right parties in the absence of the crisis. Fourth, many of these islands belong to the
same electoral and administrative district, which ensures that they are identical across a plethora
of observable andunobservable characteristics, suchas the candidates running foroice, regional
government, police, judiciary, and access to EU funds.
Our study makes four main contributions. First, we provide rare causal evidence of the eects
of exposure to the refugee crisis on support for extreme-right parties. For a number of reasons, the
Aegean refugee crisis is an ideal case to test for the “flashpotential” (Sniderman,Hagendoorn, and
Prior 2004) of immigration politics, when widespread concerns about asylum seekers (Bansak,
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016) coupled with a sudden influx of immigrants are hypothesized
to lead to large-scale electoral mobilization (see also Hopkins 2010). Specifically, Greece received
about 400,000 new asylum seekers between April 2015 and September 2015 (UNHCR 2016),
which translates to more than 2.8 refugees per Greek resident in aected islands. These sudden
inflows reached their first peak just before the September 2015 election, thereby ensuring that
the refugee crisis would be a highly salient issue when island residents cast their vote in the
midst of the concurrent financial and economic crisis. The results suggest that this sudden and
massive increase in refugee arrivals indeed fueled support for the radical anti-immigrant and
anti-asylum-seeker party Golden Dawn (GD), but onlymoderately so: vote shares for GD increased
about 2 percentage points (a 44 percent increase at the average) because of the exposure to the
refugee crisis. This increase in vote shares, however, is statistically significant and substantively
meaningful. GD became the third-largest (and minor opposition) party in the fragmented Greek
multi-party system, and was awarded certain constitutionally protected privileges, such as the
right to appoint the second deputy Speaker of the house and important vice-chair positions
in parliamentary committees. In a companion study, we fielded a targeted survey to examine
the impact of refugee arrivals on natives’ political attitudes and policy preferences (Hangartner
et al. 2018).
Second, by employing within-island variation in proximity to refugee hotspots and measuring
the number of refugee arrivals per resident, we show that the intensity of exposure further
catalyzes the electoral boost of the extreme-right. Third, our study fills a gap by examining
the political repercussions of the refugee crisis in Greece, the European country arguably most
aectedby thecurrent refugeecrisis andhometoGD, themostextreme-rightandneo-fascistparty
currently represented in a European parliament (Heinö 2016).
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Fourth, Greek islands served as temporary transit destinations during our study period, and
most refugees continued their journeys toAthenswithin 48hours of arrival (Capon2015). This very
unusual feature of our case enables us to make two important contributions to our theoretical
understanding of the drivers of antirefugee attitudes. The refugees’ very temporary presence
on the island eliminated most avenues for sustained interactions between locals and refugees,
a prerequisite for the contact theory to work (Allport 1979). Hence, this setting allows us to
isolate the impact of exposure to (rather than contact with) refugee populations on political
behavior—something thatprevious studies couldnotachieve. Inaddition, our findingsarediicult
to reconcile with realistic group conflict theory (Campbell 1965), in which competition for scarce
resources is a necessary condition for conflict between theoutgroupand thedominant group.Our
study shows that mere exposure is suicient to fuel prejudice and change political behavior.
2 The Unfolding of the Refugee Crisis in the Aegean Sea
2.1 Setting
Our study focuses on Greece, which was for Syrian refugees the main entry point to Europe, due
to its proximity to the Turkish border, a long coastline that marks the EU external borders, and
many diicult-to-patrol islands. Out of the 1.3 million new asylum seekers who reached European
territory in 2015, more than 850,000 of them did so by arriving in one of the Greek Aegean islands
(UNHCR 2016). But while some islands were strongly aected by these sudden refugee inflows,
many other islands did not experience any contact with refugees. Most refugees le the islands of
first arrival within a very short period, typically less than 48 hours, to continue their journeys via
the ports of Piraeus or Thessaloniki to central and northern Europe. The SI Appendix Section S.2
provides more information about how the refugee crisis unfolded in Greece.
2.2 Data
This study draws upon a new panel data set1 that covers all habitable Greek islands. The units of
analysis are either municipalities (N = 95) or townships (N = 248). The data come from three
dierent sources: electoral outcomes (at themunicipality and township level) are provided for all
four elections between 2012 and 2015 by the oicial record of the Greek Ministry of Interior and
Public Administration; monthly data on refugee arrivals per island are provided by the UNHCR
(UNHCR 2015), and geographic data on island’s distance from the Turkish coast are obtained from
the online mapping service Google Maps, which provides satellite imagery and geospatial data
visualization and measurement. The SI Appendix Sections S3 and S4 provide more information
about the data sources, descriptive statistics and coding decisions.
2.3 Empirical Strategies
We employ two complementary empirical strategies to identify the causal eect of exposure to
the refugee crisis on electoral support for the GD. First, we apply a dierence-in-dierences (DID)
estimator to obtain an estimate of the eect of refugee arrivals on the September 2015 vote share
for GD. The underlying logic behind the design is that for the islands that received refugees in
the summer of 2015, we construct the counterfactual change in GD vote share between January
and September 2015 had they not received refugees, by using the change in GD vote share in the
unaected islands. This strategy yields causal estimates so long as the parallel trends assumption
holds. In the current context, this assumption implies that the vote share for GD would follow the
same trajectory from January to September 2015 among treated and nontreated islands in the
absence of the refugee crisis.
To assess whether this assumption holds and thus to evaluate the validity of the design, we
turn to past elections, exploring whether the over-time trend in GD vote share diers between
1 All data and code are accessible at the Political Analysis Dataverse (Dinas et al. 2018).
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Figure 2. The analyses at the municipality (le panel) and township level (right panel) show that treated
and control islands experience highly similar changes in support for GD prior to the refugee crisis, thereby
strengtheningour confidence in theparallel trendassumption. Theblue connected line indicates the average
vote share for GD in themunicipalities (le panel) and townships (right panel) that received refugees. The red
dashed line denotes the average GD vote share in municipalities and townships without refugee exposure.
treatment and control units. The le panel of Figure 2 uses the municipality-level analysis,
whereas the right panel depicts the results from the township-level analysis. In both graphs two
lines are shown, each representing the over-time change in the vote share for GD from the first
election of 2012 until the last election of 2015. The red line denotes treated units, and the blue line
denotes control units. We see that both groups travel in parallel until September 2015, the first
election aer the onset of the refugee crisis in Greece. Moreover, consistent with our expectation
that the within-island variation helps to account more eectively for unobservable dierences
in support for GD, we see that the treated and control groups are similar not only in terms of
changes, but also in levels before the refugee crisis. Taken together, the two graphs strengthen
our confidence in the validity of the DID design.
The second empirical strategy employs an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to identify the
impact of the refugee crisis on the GD vote share. In particular, we use each island’s distance
to the Turkish coast as an instrument for the number of refugee arrivals. To test whether the
first-stage regression is suiciently strong (Stock and Yogo 2005), we must determine whether
the islands closer to the coast were indeed more likely to have received refugees than those
farther away. Figure 3 shows that this the case. The le panel displays the probability of having
receivedany refugeesasa functionof thedistance fromthecoast. Thebluecurve representsa local
regression smoother that is fitted to the data. We find a monotonically descending relationship,
indicating that the farther away an island is from the coast, the less likely it is to have received any
refugees during the current crisis. The right panel shows that the samemonotonically decreasing
relationship exists for the intensity of refugee exposure (measured as the relative number of
refugee arrivals per island resident). Both graphs indicate that this relationship can be accurately
modeledby a logarithmic function (red line). Accordingly,weuse loggeddistance from theTurkish
coast as an instrument of refugee exposure in the subsequent analysis.
The two identification strategies are complementary. While the DID strategy recovers the
average treatment eect for the treated islands, the IV strategy, recovers a dierent causal
estimand, namely the local average treatment eect (i.e., the complier treatment eect).
Moreover, whereas the DID relies on the parallel trends assumption, the IV strategy relies on the
Elias Dinas et al. ` Political Analysis 248
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Figure3.First stage: islands’ distance fromtheTurkish coast predicts thenumberof refugeearrivals. Theblue
curves denote the local linear regression smoother (span = 0.5), with the shaded area capturing the 95%
confidence intervals. The le panel shows the propensity of receiving refugees against the distance to the
Turkish coast, whereas the right panel shows the number of refugee arrivals per capita against the distance.
The red curves display the predicted level of treatment exposure conditional on logged distance. In both
graphs, the logarithmic function of distance from the Turkish coast provides a good approximation to the
data.
exclusion restriction (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996), namely the assumption that the only way
proximity to the Turkish coast aects support for GD is through refugee arrival. The SI Appendix
Section S5 provides more information about the estimation strategy for the DID and IV analyses.
A placebo test confirms that control islands provide a credible counterfactual for treated
islands. For this, we exploit a particular feature of the Greek election law: Registered nonresident
voters cast their ballot in their town of residency, even when they do not live in the town they
are registered in. We use this group to examine the behavior of nonresidents who live on the
Greek mainland but are registered to vote for islands with refugee exposure. These placebo tests,
presented in theSI AppendixS6.3, reveal that electoral support forGDdidnot change substantially
among (i) nonresident voters of treated islands over time and (ii) between nonresidents of treated
and control islands.
3 Results
3.1 Panel Data Estimates
Massive refugee arrivals from theTurkish coast to theGreek islands started in spring and escalated
over the summer of 2015. Our panel data estimates exploit that Greece held two elections in
the same year, in January and September. Furthermore, refugee arrivals were highly clustered
among a subset of the Aegean islands. We use the cross-island as well as within-island variation
(Figure S2, Panel A) to assess the impact of refugee presence of vote share for GD (Figure S2, Panel
B). Employing aDID estimator,we treat the September 2015 election as theposttreatment election
and the three last elections preceding the January 2015 election as the pretreatment elections. A
detailed description of empirical strategy is provided in the SI Appendix Section S5.
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Table 1. Impact of refugee arrivals on GD vote share.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Outcome: GD(t ) GD(t−1) GD(t ) GD(t−1) GD(t ) GD(t−1)
Treatment: Binary treatment Binary treatment Binary treatment Binary treatment Arrivals per capita Arrivals per capita
Unit: Municipality Municipality Township Township Municipality Municipality
Exposure 2.079 2.112 −0.040 −0.055 2.272 2.193 0.093 0.127 0.604 0.600 −0.004 −0.033
(0.351) (0.674) (0.392) (0.713) (0.263) (0.455) (0.262) (0.439) (0.178) (0.264) (0.119) (0.262)
Unit FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Election FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Unit trends X X X X X X
N 380 380 285 285 992 992 744 744 379 379 284 284
Elections 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3
Clusters 95 95 95 95 248 248 248 248 95 95 95 95
Note: Models 1–12 display ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coeicients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Models 1–8 use a binary treatment indicator while models
9–12 use the number of refugee arrivals per capita. Models 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10 show the eect on GD vote share. Models 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 use the GD vote share from the previous election
as placebo outcome. All models control for election and unit of analysis (municipality or township) fixed eects. In addition, models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 also include unit-specific linear
time trends.
EliasDinasetal.
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Table 1presents themain result andshows that refugeearrivals catalyzeGDvote share.2Model 1
usesmunicipalities as theunit of analysis andshows that in islands that received refugees, support
for GD rose by 2 percentage points (std. error 0.35, two-tailed p < 0.001). The average vote share
forGD in2015amongallmunicipalities in theestimation sample is 4.5percentagepoints. Thus, the
magnitudeof the backlash eect amounts to a 44percent increase in the party’s vote share.Model
2 shows that the results are virtually identicalwhenadding linearmunicipality-specific trends that
capture smooth changes in unobserved confounders. Models 3 and 4 are the placebo analogues
of Models 1 and 2, respectively. They present the same result but using GD’s lagged vote share as
the outcome. Reassuringly, we find no eect of exposure to the refugee crisis on GD’s vote share
in the previous election.
Models 5 and 6 use townships as the unit of analysis. Recall that townships are clustered
within municipalities and thus allow for within-island variation. The results are very similar to
the municipality-level analysis. We find that townships receiving refugees see an increase in the
GD vote share by slightly more than 2 percentage points (std. error 0.26, two-tailed p < 0.001)
compared to townships that were not exposed to refugee arrivals. Model 6 shows that the eect
remains robust to the inclusion of township-specific linear trends. This result suggests that the
increase in the party’s vote share is not uniform within the aected islands, but rather more
concentrated among those areas directly exposed to the refugee crisis. The placebo tests shown
in Models 7 and 8 confirm that treated and control townships follow parallel trends prior to the
January 2015 election. The dierence in the vote share for GD between treated and untreated
townshipsbefore that election is essentially zero, bothwithandwithout the inclusionof township-
specific trends.
Finally, Models 9 to 12 replace the binary treatment indicator with the per capita number of
refugees arriving in each island. Models 9 and 10 present the treatment eects and indicate that
the arrival of one refugee per resident increases GD’s vote share by 0.77 percentage points. To see
more concretely what this means, take Samos, which received approximately 2.5 refugee arrivals
per resident. As a result, the vote share for GD in September 2015 is expected to have risen by
almost 2 percentage points because of the refugee arrivals. This estimate remains robust when
addingmunicipality-specific linear trends. Models 11 and 12 display the placebo results, which use
the lagged values of support for GD. Reassuringly, we find that exposure to refugee arrivals in 2015
plays no role in the vote share for GD in the pretreatment elections. The average treatment eect
is again very close to zero both with and without municipality-specific trends. Figure S2 in the SI
Appendix provides a visual summary of those results.
3.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates
Distance to the Turkish coast plays a key role in whether and how many refugees arrived on a
particular island in the Aegean in 2015. As discussed in the previous section,we exploit this natural
experiment by using distance from the Turkish coast as an instrument of refugee exposure.
Figure 4 illustrates the logic of the estimation strategy. The right panel of Figure 4 shows the
change in GD’s vote share, fromMay 2012 to January 2015, as a function of the (logged) distance of
each island from the Turkish coast. Since the Syrian refugee crisis impacted Europe only aer the
springof 2015,weexpect no relationshipbetweendistance from the coast and support forGD. This
is exactlywhatwe find: The linear regression coeicientmeasuring the eect of loggeddistance to
the Turkish coast on change in GD support betweenMay 2012 and January 2015 is 0.048 (std. error
2 To address the intra-class correlation stemming from the panel structure of our data, we cluster standard errors at
the municipality and township level, respectively. To address further concerns about inference based on DID estimates
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004), we also adopted three alternative inference strategies: (i) block-bootstrapped
standard errors (Table S9 in SI Appendix); (ii) collapsing all pretreatment time points into one pretreatment period (Table
S10 in SI Appendix); and (iii) placebo tests based on permutation tests (Figure S8 in SI Appendix). All these analyses are
described in more detail in the SI Appendix.
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Figure 4. Intention-to-treat eect: Proximity to the Turkish coast increases GD vote share aer the inflow
of refugees in September 2015, but has no impact on previous elections. The blue lines indicate linear OLS
regressions with 95% confidence intervals (shaded areas). The le panel shows the change in GD vote shares
from January to September 2015, the right panel shows the change in GD vote shares betweenMay 2012 and
January 2015. Both graphs use the logged distance from the Turkish coast in the horizontal axis.
0.181, two-tailed, p < 0.782), i.e., close to zero and far away from conventional level of statistical
significance. The lepanel of Figure 4 shows the sameanalysis but using the change in support for
GD from January to September 2015 as outcome. For this period, we estimate a linear regression
coeicient of −0.433 (std. error 0.110, two-tailed p < 0.001), indicating that aer the onset of the
crisis, proximity to the coast is associated with a significantly higher increase in GD vote share.
Table S3 in the SI Appendix presents the IV estimates, using the binary and the continuous
treatment indicators. Models 1 and 3 show the first-stage regression results. Both the binary and
continuous measures for refugee arrivals are negatively related to distance to the Turkish coast.
The F statistic measuring the strength of the first stage is 46 and 31, respectively, well above the
critical value (Stock and Yogo 2005) of 10. Model 2 shows that the presence of refugees during 2015
increases the GD vote share by more than 2 percentage points. Model 4 employs the continuous
measure and shows that for an additional refugee per capita the vote share for GD increases by
almost 1 percentage point. Both estimates are very close to those obtained using the DID design.3
Model 5 presents the intent-to-treat result using all four elections sinceMay 2012. The result shows
that the eect disappears entirely whenmoving from an island that is 2 km away from the Turkish
coast (e.g. Samos) to an island that is almost 100 km away (e.g. Karpathos).4
Taken together, both empirical strategies lead to the same conclusion: The refugee crisis
resulted in a statistically significant and politically substantial increase in electoral support for
Europe’s most radical right-wing party, GD. In the SI appendix, we extend this evidence in two
related dimensions. First we look at the intent-to-treat eect in greater detail, showing that
distance to the Turkish coast predicts GD vote share only in September 2015, but not in any
previous election (see SI Appendix Table S5). Second, we drop observations far from the Turkish
coast. We use several cut-o points, ranging from 500 to 50 kilometer maximum distance to the
3 Whereas the 2SLS estimator recovers the local average treatment eect, the DID estimator unpacks the Average Treatment
Eect on the Treated (ATT). The similarity in themagnitude of the eects between the two estimation techniques suggests
low levels of noncompliance to treatment assignment status in the IV analysis.
4 The 95municipalities in our analysis are nestedwithin 20 prefectures. We account for this grouping by clustering standard
errors at the prefecture level. To explorewhether our inferences are fragile due to the relatively low number of higher-level
prefectures, we repeat the IV analysis using bootstrapped standard errors (SI Appendix Table S4). All results are robust to
these alternative specifications.
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coast. The results appear in Figure S7 of the SI Appendix and appear remarkably robust to changes
in the range of distance to the Turkish coast.
Is GD ‘stealing’ votes from other parties or mobilizing citizens that would otherwise abstain?
While a full analysis of the mechanism underlying these shis in electoral support is beyond
the scope of this study, our data provides some evidence that allows us to examine these two
hypotheses. The results, shown in Tables S6 and S7 of the SI Appendix Section S6.5, show that
the rise of GD caused by the refugee crisis did not aect the vote shares of the governing coalition
parties of the leist SYRIZA and ANEL, but that themajor opposition partyNeaDimokratia suered
significant electoral losses. This suggests that a significant segment of voters turned from the
center-right Nea Dimokratia, whose electoral agenda was dominated by economic issues and the
financial bail-out negotiations, to the extreme-right GD, which established itself as the fiercest
anti-immigrant and anti-asylum-seeker platform. At the same time, the DID and IV results show
that overall turnout increased significantly in treated islands, which suggests that the refugee
crisis also enabled GD to mobilize new voters who previously had not participated in elections.
4 Conclusion
This study exploits a natural experiment in the Aegean Sea to examine the eect of exposure
to the refugee crisis on natives’ support for extreme-right parties. Using two complementary
identification strategies and multiple outcomes and placebo tests, we find that in municipalities
and townships that experienced sudden and sizeable refugee inflows, electoral support for the
extreme-right party GD increased by 2 percentage points, a more than 40 percent increase
on average. These eects are further amplified by the degree of exposure, measured by the
number of refugees per resident who arrived in the treated islands. However, given the size and
suddenness of the refugee inflows, the ensuing chaos on aected islands just before the election,
and the concurrent economic downturn caused by the financial crisis—all factors that have been
theorized to fuel electoral backlash (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004)—we interpret the
2 percentage point increase in GD vote shares as a relatively modest eect.
These findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of the dynamic
nature of attitudes toward asylum seekers. Mirroring findings from research on how immigration
to the U.S. can trigger local anti-immigrant sentiment and policies (Hopkins 2010), we find strong
evidence that extreme-right parties can successfully convert prevalent negative attitudes toward
Muslim asylum seekers (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016) into vote shares in times of
crisis. Previous research on the electoral consequences of refugee migration has found negative
eects on support for far-right parties in Austria (Steinmayr 2016), lending support to the theory
that contact between natives and refugees alleviates animus (Allport 1979). Our study shows that
hostility prevails in the Greek context, where asylum seekers quickly continue their journeys from
the arrival island to the Greek mainland and extensive contact and interactions between island
residents andasylumseekers are therefore not possible. Given theonly temporary presenceof the
refugee population onmost of these islands, our findings are also hard to reconcile with theories
of realistic group conflict (Campbell 1965), which posits that conflict between the outgroup and
dominant group emerges over scarce resources such as access to jobs, housing, or education. In
our context, there is no specific competition between refugees and residents on treated islands
over any of these resources (see Hangartner et al. 2018 for details). Our study therefore shows that
mere exposure to the refugee crisis is suicient to fuel support for extreme-right parties.
Supplementarymaterials
For supplementary materials accompanying this paper, please visit
https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2018.48.
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